Today's opinions: ineffective counsel,mandatory joinder, and firearm enhancements

Today the Supreme Court released three decisions.

State v. A.N.J., No. 81236-5. In 2004, when Defendant A.N.J. was 12 years old, he pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation. Shortly thereafter, after realizing the consequences of his juvenile sex offense criminal history, he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. A.N.J. contends his court appointed counsel was ineffective and as a result his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. According to testimony, the defending attorney spent something between 35 to 90 minutes total with A.N.J. before the plea hearing, did not adequately explain the consequences of the plea, did no independent investigation, did not carefully review the plea agreement, and consulted with no experts. The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion, agreed that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. The Court remanded to the trial court with directions to allow A.N.J. to withdraw his plea. Justices Sanders and James Johnson each wrote separate concurring opinions.

State v. Gamble, No. 80131-2. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the 8-1 majority opinion, concluded that the mandatory joinder rule does not bar the homicide charges brought against the defendants. In four consolidated appeals, each of the defendants was originally convicted of second degree felony murder with assault as the underlying felony. After their convictions, the Supreme Court held in another case (Andress) that a conviction of second degree felony murder could not be based on assault as the predicate felony. Each of the defendants challenged their convictions, which were vacated. The defendants were then retried on new charges. Each contended that under the mandatory joinder rule the new charges would have to have been joined with the original second degree felony murder charge. The trial courts each ruled that the Andress decision was an extraordinary, unforeseeable event, and the “ends of justice” exception to the mandatory joinder rule applied. The Supreme Court agrees today. Justice Richard Sanders dissented.

State v. Mandanas, No. 80441-9. May a sentencing court impose multiple firearm enhancements when the defendant's underlying crimes constitute the same criminal conduct? Bayani John Mandanas was convicted of felony assault and felony harassment, both while armed with a firearm. The trial court ruled that the offenses were not the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing, and that the firearm enhancements were to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals agreed in part, but held that the offenses were the same criminal conduct and that the enhancements were to run consecutively. Mandanas argues that multiple enhancements for the same conduct should not be imposed. Reviewing the sentencing statute (RCW 9.94A.589), the Supreme Court (Justice Alexander writing) says “a sentencing court must impose multiple firearm enhancements where a defendant is convicted of multiple enhancement-eligible offenses that amount to the same criminal conduct under the sentencing statute.”

Today's arguments, Jan. 28, 2010

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in three cases today (docket, briefs):

In the morning session: 

Broom v. Morgan Stanley, No. 82311-1. Michael, Kevin, and Andrea Broom sued Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. for mismanaging an investment account. Their claims were rejected by an arbitration panel because they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Brooms appealed to King County Superior Court, and the court held that statute of limitations in Washington do not apply to claims in arbitration. The court vacated the arbitration panel’s decision as an error of law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. Morgan Stanley argues both that statutes of limitations do apply to arbitration, and that courts cannot vacate arbitration decisions because of “errors of law.”

State v. Regan, No. 82476-2. Francis Regan was convicted of fourth degree assault. Most of his sentence was suspended and he received 24 months of probation. One of the conditions of probation was that he commit “no criminal violations of the law.” During the probationary period, Regan was accused of another assault. He was brought to court for trial and a probation hearing. A jury acquitted him, but the judge at the probation hearing believed that Regan had committed the assault and revoked Regan’s probation.

Probation violations normally have a lower burden of proof than criminal trials. But Regan argues that the term “no criminal violations of the law” requires criminal conduct, and that criminal conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Since he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he says his probation should not have been revoked. The Grays Harbor Superior Court reversed the probation ruling, but the Court of Appeals (Div. 1) reversed the superior court. Defendant now appeals to the Supreme Court.

Then in the afternoon session: 

McGuire v. Bates, No. 82659-5. Whether a settlement for “all claims” includes attorney fees. Julianne McGuire hired Robert Bates to remodel her kitchen. After it was done, she claimed that he had done the work improperly and sued him. The case went to mandatory arbitration, but before the arbitration the parties settled “all claims” for $2180.

RCW 18.27.040 allows the prevailing party in a suit by a homeowner against a contractor to recover attorney fees. McGuire moved for attorney fees based on this statute. The arbitrator denied the motion because the parties had agreed to settle “all claims.” However, the courts held that attorney fees are a cost, not a claim, and were thus not included in the settlement agreement. Bates appealed, and also argues that McGuire is not a “prevailing party” because the case was settled.

Tomorrow's opinions, Jan. 28, 2010

Tomorrow the Supreme Court will issue opinions in at least three cases.

State v. A.N.J., No. 81236-5. Defendant, a twelve-year-old boy, was convicted of first degree child molestation. He pleaded guilty after telling the court that his attorney had read the plea statement to him, he understood it, and he had no questions about it. He is now attempting to withdraw his plea.

Defendant’s appeals team argues he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Prior to the trial, his public defender spent less than two hours with him. The lawyer allowed the boy’s parents to be present at the meetings, potentially interfering with a confidential attorney-client relationship. Finally, the lawyer failed to investigate the case and inadequately advised the boy of the consequences of a plea bargain.

State v. Gamble, No. 80131-2. This case is on appeal from Second Division Court of Appeals, and was consolidated with four other cases with a similar question. Defendant Gamble hosted a party for his high school friends, during which a fight broke out. During the fight Gamble struck one of the other kids, who later died as a result of his injuries. Gamble was convicted of first degree felony murder and second degree murder, both of which were later reversed. The state then filed a charge against Gamble for first degree manslaughter.

The question before the Court is whether allowing the state to file manslaughter charges after the murder convictions had been reversed violates the mandatory joinder rule (which requires that related offenses be tried together) and/or Gamble's double jeopardy rights.

State v. Mandanas, No. 80441-9. Is double jeopardy violated when a sentencing court imposes multiple firearm enhancements when the defendant's underlying crimes constitute the same criminal conduct?

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Today's oral arguments - January 26, 2010

Today the Court will hear its normal four arguments, two in the morning and two in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

Hudson v. Hapner, No. 82409-6. At what point can a party withdraw a request for a civil trial? That's the procedural question before the Court in this case.

Clifford Hapner rear-ended Lea Hudson, and Hudson sued for damages. The case went to mandatory arbitration where Hudson was awarded $14,538. After mandatory arbitration a party can request a trial before the superior court, which Hapner did. But the jury awarded Hudson $292,298. Hapner appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial.

After discovery for the second trial, but before the trial took place, Hapner filed a notice of withdrawal of his motion for a trial. This would allow him to pay only the arbitration award, plus Hapner's court costs. The trial court struck the withdrawal at Hudson's request, but the Division Two Court of Appeals reversed, disagreeing with Hudson's argument that court rules include a time limit for withdrawal after a trial takes place.

State v. Osman, No. 82671-4. The question before the Court is what legal standard superior courts should use to review lower court rulings on the importance of missing trial records.

Abdinasir Osman was arrested and convicted for DUI. After the trial, Osman's attorney discovered that part of the trial had not been recorded. The missing portion included part of Osman's cross examination, objections to an exhibit, attorney arguments, and the judge's findings and conclusions.

A party in a district court is entitled to a new trial if a “significant or material portion” of the electronic recording is lost. Osman appealed to the superior court for a new trial, which remanded the question of whether the missing record was material back to the district court. The district court found that the missing portion was not material.

The superior court fully reviewed the district court's decision, concluded that the missing portion was material, and ordered a new trial. The state appealed, and the Division One Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, concluding that the superior court should only have looked at whether the district court overstepped its bounds in making the decision (abuse of discretion), rather than taking a whole new look at the question of materiality.

Afternoon session

State v. Hall, No. 82558-1. This case concerns whether multiple attempts to tamper with a witness can be prosecuted as multiple crimes.

Isiah Hall was charged with burglary, and Desirae Aquiningoc was called as a witness. Before the trial, Hall called Aquiningoc several times from prison and tried to get her to lie at the trial or to go into hiding. Hall was convicted of multiple counts of witness tampering.

Hall argues on appeal that all of his calls were part of a single case of witness tampering, and that convicting him multiple times violates double jeopardy. The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that each attempt to get Aquiningoc to lie or hide was a separate case of tampering.

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7. In this case, the Court will consider whether the rape shield statute bars testimony about contemporaneous sexual behavior for the purpose of proving consent.

Kashauna Dixon claimed that she was raped by her uncle, Christopher Jones. Jones admitted to having sex with her, but claimed that she consented. According to Jones, they were having a party with several others that included alcohol, sex, and drugs.

Based on Washington's rape shield statute, the trial court barred Jones from testifying about the party. Jones appealed, arguing that the statute only prohibits testimony about “past sexual behavior,” and that he wanted to testify about sexual behavior contemporaneous with the alleged rape. The Division Three Court of Appeals held that past behavior can refer even to the very recent past, and that even if the rape shield statute didn't apply the evidence would have been inadmissible because it would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Dixon.

Jones also appealed on other due process grounds, including the prosecutor's statement to the jury that Jones refused to submit to warrantless DNA testing.

This week at the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court will hear arguments this week on Tuesday and Thursday, and may issue opinions on Thursday.

Last Friday Chief Justice Barbara Madsen delivered a written report to the legislature on the State of the Judiciary. In it she discusses the funding crisis facing the state's courts, especially at the local level, which have totaled more than $17 million dollars in reductions in the past two years alone.

Today's opinions: medical marijuana, parental rights, class action suits

The Supreme Court issued rulings in seven cases this morning, including two highly-anticipated decisions dealing with whether an authorization to use medical marijuana is a defense to criminal possession, and whether the state's Consumer Protection Act allows out-of-state litigants to join a Washington class action lawsuit.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous ruling holding that a couple’s marital community is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse. Without his wife’s knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson’s home. After Mr. Wilson was arrested the couple began dissolving the marriage and executed a property settlement transferring 90 percent of community assets to Mrs. Wilson (and theoretically insulating the funds from any potential lawsuit). Clayton sued, and the entire marital community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer. The Court of Appeals agreed and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion holding that Amy Singleton’s parental rights had been improperly terminated. Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed this order as the State had not offered Singleton required training that would allow her to rehabilitate.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nationwide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act? Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to make Washington “a locus of nationwide class action litigation.” The Court said the trial court was correct in declining to certify a nationwide class.

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Patrick Drum’s conviction for burglary after he entered a house while high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld an assault conviction, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion. Anthony Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer’s word). The Court wrote: “We conclude that the warrant was valid because it was supported by a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of his release.”

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Justice James Johnson writes a 4-vote lead opinion, with four other justices agreeing in a separate opinion, that rejected a defendant’s claim that he was qualified to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. Two police officers were informed of a marijuana growing operation at the residence of Jason and Tina Fry. The officers smelled marijuana when they approached. Fry did not consent to a search, and presented a document purporting to be authorization for medical marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant and seized over two pounds of marijuana. At trial, Fry argued to suppress the marijuana because of his medical marijuana authorization. The judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence seized at the Frys’ home, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm—a claimed violation of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the opinion.

Today's arguments - January 21, 2010

Today the Court is hearing three arguments, two in the morning and one this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

State v. Turner/Faagata, No. 81626-3. These consolidated cases present the question of whether two crimes can be merged for sentencing without completely wiping out any potential future sentencing on the lesser crime.

Both defendants are charged with two crimes (Turner for assault and robbery, Faagata for two murders) that arose out of the same facts, so it would be a violation of double jeopardy if a court convicted them of each crime separately. In both cases, the trial court merged the two crimes for sentencing, but stated that the lesser of the two crimes was still valid (i.e. separate) for future sentencing if the conviction for the greater crime was invalidated on appeal.

The cases originated in Pierce County Superior Court, and were appealed to Division Two Court of Appeals. The defendants lost at the appellate level.

Seglaine v. Washington Department of Labor & Industries, No. 81931-9. This case concerns whether L&I has statutory immunity from charges of malicious prosecution for complaints to the police about an individual.

Due to arguments between Seglaine and East Wenatchee L&I employees, the department staff served Seglaine with a "no trespass" notice, ordering him to not enter the building. Seglaine later tried to come back, staff called the police and Seglaine was arrested. Charges were later dropped, but Seglaine sued L&I for malicious prosecution, among other things.

Under RCW 4.24.510, a person who complains to a government agency, like the police, is immune to prosecution for the complaint. The trial court ruled for L&I based on this statue. Seglaine argues that L&I is not a "person," that it doesn't apply to malicious prosecution claims, and that L&I must prove it acted in good faith.

Summary judgment for the defendant was granted by Thurston County Superior Court and upheld by Division Two Court of Appeals.

Afternoon session

State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. The question before the court is whether the state has to prove which time limit requirement a sex offender falls under in order to convict them of failing to register.

Sex offenders are required to register with the county sheriff when they change addresses. The statute requiring this registration gives different time limits depending on where the offender is moving: 72 hours for a fixed address, 42 hours for homeless, 10 days for out of county. Sex offender Michael Peterson left his residence and failed to register with the state for over a month.

Peterson was convicted of failure to register. On appeal, he argues that the time limit is an element of the crime, and that the differing time limits create alternative methods of committing the crime. Since the state doesn't know where he was during the time he failed to register, it can't prove which time limit applies, and thus can't convict Peterson of any form of failure to register.

The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the time limits “do not define the elements or create alternative means of committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender. For a sex offender, like Peterson, there is only one means of committing a crime--knowingly failing to register[.]”

Tomorrow's opinions, Jan. 21, 2010

The following opinions may be filed by the Washington Supreme Court:

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Whether a couple's community property is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse perpetrated on someone employed to take care of the community property. Without his wife's knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson's home. When Mrs. Wilson found out she obtained a divorce and 90% of the community property. Clayton sued, and the entire community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found evidence of fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Whether sufficient evidence exists to terminate parental rights. Amy Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. She argues that the evidence is insufficient to justify the court's determination.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nation-wide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act?

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Patrick Drum unlawfully entered a house while he was high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea. The Court of Appeals (Div. II) affirmed.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The issue in this case is whether a warrant for failure to appear at a probationary hearing requires probable cause that probation has been violated, or if it can rest on evidence of the underlying crime that led to incarceration/probation. Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer's word). But the Court of Appeals decided the warrant was valid because it was for failure to appear and related back to the original crime of assault, for which there was certainly probable cause.

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Whether a diagnosed condition of severe anxiety, anger, and depression qualified a defendant to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Whether a firearm sentence enhancement is constitutional where use of a firearm is an element of the underlying crime. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm. He says that this violates the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions.

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Today's arguments, Jan. 19, 2010

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in four cases today.

In the morning session:

Bellevue School District v. E.S., No. 83024-0 (briefs). Whether a child has the right to be represented by counsel at an initial truancy hearing. A student in the Bellevue School District, “E.S.,” missed 73 of the first 100 days of school, and the District filed a truancy petition. E.S., who was not represented by counsel at the truancy hearing, was found truant. E.S.’s lawyer moved to dismiss because E.S. had not been represented at the truancy hearing.

The school district argues that E.S. had no right to appointed counsel because she couldn’t actually be sanctioned at the initial truancy hearing. King County Superior Court ruled for the school district, but on appeal the Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held that “[a] child’s interests in her liberty, privacy, and education are in jeopardy at an initial truancy hearing, and she is unable to protect these interests herself. Due process demands she be represented in the initial truancy hearing.”

Kelley v. Centennial Contractors, No. 82474-6 (briefs). Phillip and Monica Blackshear sued Centennial Contractors Enterprises for injuries caused when a steel beam was dropped on Phillip. After they won the suit, they filed a complaint for loss of consortium on behalf of their three children. The complaint stated that it would have been impractical to include their claims with their parents’ suit. George Kelly was appointed guardian ad litem for the children.

At trial, the children’s case was dismissed because the court said their claims should have been joined with their parents’ claims. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that since the children did not yet have a guardian ad litem it would have been impossible to join them to the suit, and that it would have been impractical for them to bring their claims until the results of their father’s surgery were known. (For financial reasons, the parents’ suit was brought while the results of the surgery were still unknown.)

In the afternoon session:

Freeman v. Freeman, No. 82283-2 (briefs). What must be proved for a trial court to terminate a permanent protection order? Robin Freeman got a permanent protection order against Rob Freeman due to domestic violence. Rob, a member of the military, has since moved away. He lost a hand in Iraq, and this made it necessary to retrain and change careers within the military. However, he needed a security clearance and could not get one because of the permanent protection order.

Rob moved to terminate the protection order. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Robin is currently in reasonable fear of Rob. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Rob had not been in Washington or had contact with Robin since 1998, that he had violated neither the protection order nor any law, and that “due to time and distance, there is no evidence to support a current fear” of physical harm.

Skinner v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of Medina, No. 82306-5 (briefs). Whether the time limit for appealing a Commission’s decision ran from the initial appeal or the motion for reconsideration. Roger Skinner appealed his dismissal from the City of Medina police force to the Medina Civil Service Commission (Commission). The Commission upheld his dismissal, and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Skinner filed an appeal in King County Superior Court, and the trial court dismissed, saying Skinner had failed file his appeal of the initial order within 30 days as required by law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) reversed, holding that Roger Skinner had appealed within 30 days of the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.

This week at the Supreme Court, January 18, 2010

The Supreme Court will hear arguments on Tuesday and Thursday, and may issue opinions on Thursday.

Notable decisions from 2009

Here are some of the notable decisions of the Washington State Supreme Court, selected by our writers.

Community Care Coalition of Washington v. Reed – Supreme Court lacked constitutional power to prohibit Secretary of State from certifying an initiative measure as an initiative to the people (rather than to the legislature) for placement on general election ballot.

Majority Author: Gerry Alexander
Dissent Author: Mary Fairhurst
Vote: 6-3

 

 

 

 

Brown v. Owen – Senate Majority Leader Lisa Brown challenged the constitutionality of Initiative 601’s requirement that tax increases be approved by two-thirds of the legislature. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the legislature’s parliamentary process and suggested the legislature change the law if it dislikes it.

Majority Author: Mary Fairhurst
Vote: 9-0

In re Estate of Kissinger – A man was convicted of killing his mother, but was held not guilty by reason of insanity. The Court ruled he could not later inherit a portion of the wrongful death settlement obtained by his mother’s estate.

Majority Author: Tom Chambers
Vote: 9-0

In re F5 Networks, Inc. – In a ruling that disappointed business advocates, the Court adopted the “demand futility standard,” allowing shareholders to commence litigation in the name of the corporation without first demanding action from the corporate board.

Majority Author: Tom Chambers
Vote: 9-0

State v. Garvin – The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from conducting “squeeze searches” of objects under a suspect’s clothing when a “pat-down” is the appropriate frisking method.

Majority Author: Richard Sanders
Vote: 9-0

City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ – The Court ruled that Woodinville violated a church’s religious liberty by preventing it from applying for a temporary permit to host a tent city. The Court also noted that the state constitution protects religious liberty more expansively than the U.S. Constitution.

Majority Author: James Johnson
Vote: 9-0

Morgan v. City of Federal Way – An investigative report concerning the municipal court’s hostile work environment and an elected official’s wrongdoing is a public record and is subject to disclosure.

Majority Author: Susan Owens
Vote: 9-0

Briggs v. Nova Services – Upholding the state’s at-will employment policy, the Court ruled that an employer did not violate state law by terminating employees and managers who protested their executive director’s managerial decisions.

Majority Author: James Johnson
Dissent Author: Susan Owens
Vote: 5-4

 

 

 

City of Federal Way v. Koenig – A court’s administrative records are not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. (Madsen and Sanders did not participate.)

Majority Author: Susan Owens
Dissent Author: Debra Stephens
Vote: 7-2

 

 

 

Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State – The Court declined to micromanage education policy, and ruled that salary disparities between employees in different school districts do not violate the state constitution’s directive to provide “general and uniform” system of education.

Majority Author: James Johnson
Vote: 9-0

State v. Rafay – The Washington Constitution guarantees a defendant’s right to self-representation on appeal.

Majority Author: Debra Stephens
Vote: 9-0

Gold Star Resorts v. Futurewise – In a victory for property owners, the Court said the state growth board lacks authority to issue “bright-line” rules limiting rural development to a maximum of one home per five acres.

Majority Author: Barbara Madsen
Vote 9-0

Opinion: Court vacates 5-year firearm sentence enhancements

State v. Williams-Walker, No. 78611-9, consolidated with State v. Graham and State v. Ruth (briefs and arguments). Under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, sections 21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution, the right to a jury trial requires that sentences be authorized by the jury’s verdict.

State law allows criminal sentences to be enhanced with additional incarceration if a firearm or deadly weapon is used in the commission of the crime. Where there is a finding that a deadly weapon was used, a two-year enhancement is authorized. Where the jury specifies that a firearm was used, a five-year enhancement is available.

In each of the three cases reviewed today, the juries were given special verdict forms for a deadly weapon enhancement, and they returned answers in the affirmative, but the trial courts each imposed the more severe five-year sentence enhancement.

The Supreme Court has previously stated that a defendant's right to a jury trial is violated if a firearm enhancement is imposed with the jury explicitly authorizing it. The cases today address a more nuanced question: whether a trial court can impose a firearm enhancement in the absence of a jury finding by special verdict that the defendant used a firearm, where the juries only authorized the less punitive deadly weapon enhancement.

The State argues that the firearm enhancement should be permitted in two of the cases as the juries found, through their guilty verdicts, that the defendants committed the crimes using a firearm. Ruth and Graham were both charged with first degree assault with a firearm, and a conviction requires the jury to find that a firearm was used.

The Court disagreed. “We decline to hold that guilty verdicts alone are sufficient to authorize sentence enhancements. If we adopted this logic, a sentencing court could disregard altogether the statutory requirement that the jury find the defendant's use of a deadly weapon or firearm by special verdict. Such a result violates both the statutory requirements and the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.”

In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Charles Johnson, the court vacated the enhanced sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. Justice Mary Fairhurst and two others dissented.

Today's arguments, Jan. 14, 2010

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in four cases today.

In the morning session:

In Re the Honorable Judith Raub Eiler, No. 200,701-5 (briefs). Judge Judith Eiler is a district court judge in King County. Based on a number of complaints, disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for treating litigants in an “angry, abusive, and condescending manner.” Eiler argues that there was not enough evidence, that the penalty is too high, and that punishing her for her demeanor violates her freedom of speech. Eiler appeals a disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 90 days without pay.

South Tacoma Way v. State, No. 82212-3 (briefs).The State Department of Transportation (DOT) sold an alley to Sustainable Urban Development #1, LLC (Sustainable). DOT failed to notify other adjacent property owners as required by law. South Tacoma Way, LLC, which also owns property next to the alley, sued DOT and Sustainable to void the contract as an ultra vires act outside DOT's authority. The trial court held that DOT was authorized to sell the property and that the failure to give notice was merely a procedural error. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that DOT is only authorized to sell property after giving notice.

In the afternoon session:

State v. Shultz, No. 80653-5 (briefs). Whether the warrantless search was justified as an “emergency.” Officers Malone and Hill went to an apartment to investigate a possible domestic disturbance. Outside, they heard a man and a woman speaking loudly. When they knocked on the door, Patricia Schultz answered. She initially told the officers that there was no one else in the apartment, but when pressed she called Sam Robertson to the door. Officer Hill took Robertson outside to question him, and Officer Malone went inside to question Shultz. Shultz did not give Malone permission to enter, but did not object either.

Shultz was moving around inside the apartment, and Malone threatened to handcuff her if she did not “sit still.” Shortly afterward, Officer Hill entered the apartment. Shultz moved something, uncovering a gun and a marijuana pipe, and Hill saw them. The officers searched the apartment, found drugs, and arrested Shultz.

Shultz unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. In upholding the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement applied based on the argument, Shultz's appearance, and the fact that Shultz lied about Robertson's presence.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs). Whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on duress. Joshua Harvill was caught selling drugs to an informer. At trial, he claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Div. 2) noted that if the elements of duress had been proved, then the contested elements of entrapment would also have been proved. Since the jury rejected entrapment, it would also have rejected duress even had the instruction been given. Thus, even if the lack of a duress instruction was in error, it did not prejudice Harvill.

Tomorrow's opinions, Jan. 14, 2010

Tomorrow the Supreme Court will issue opinions in at least one case: 

State v. Williams-Walker, No. 78611-9. Whether the trial court’s imposition of a charged firearm sentence enhancement when the jury was instructed on and found only a deadly weapon enhancement may be harmless error under Washington law. (briefs and arguments)

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Oral arguments today - January 12, 2010

We're jumping back in the saddle today, with the first oral arguments of the new year. The Court is starting off with a full load, two arguments in the morning and two this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning Session

Cudney v. ALSCO Inc., No. 83124-6. The Supreme Court is being asked to answer two questions by the U.S. District Court for Eastern Washington, concerning the impact of state public safety laws on a wrongful termination dispute.

Matthew Cudney worked for ALSCO's Spokane branch. He saw one of his superiors drunk while at work and while driving a company vehicle, so he made an internal report. He was fired shortly thereafter. Cudney sued ALSCO for wrongful termination, claiming he was fired for the report, which ALSCO denied.

Wrongful termination is designed to protect public policies (like promoting workplace safety) by preventing employer retaliation for employee reports. A required element of the claim is that there is no alternative means of protecting the public policy in question. ALSCO argues that the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act and Washington's DUI laws are adequate to protect the public policies of promoting workplace safety and protecting the public from drunk drivers.

Lummi Indian Nation v. State, No. 81809-6. This case concerns the constitutionality of parts of the Municipal Water Law of 2003, which the plaintiffs claim violates the separation of powers doctrine and due process.

In 1988 the Supreme Court ruled In Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus that it was improper to issue a water rights certificate to a private developer based on system capacity rather than on actual use. In response to uncertainty resulting from the decision, the legislature passed the Municipal Water Law.

Certain MWL definitions differ from the Supreme Court's interpretation in Theodoratus, and since the definitions are applied retroactively the tribes argue that the MWL is essentially overruling Theodoratus. They argue the legislature was taking a judicial action by saying that the law means something different from what the high court found it to mean. The trial court agreed that portions of the MWL violated separation of powers.

The MWL also allows municipal water suppliers to change the “place of use” of their water rights. Plaintiffs argue this allows municipalities to expand their water rights at the expense of third party rights, without giving the third parties any say in the matter, violating due process.

Lummi originated in King County Superior Court, and was appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Afternoon session

Proctor v. Huntington, No. 82326-0. This case is likely to become required reading in land surveyor courses, as part of the class on "Why Mixing up Property Lines is Bad." The Court is being asked in what circumstances a landowner can order the removal of a structure mistakenly built on his property.

The Proctors and the Huntington's purchased adjacent undeveloped parcels of land, and the Huntington's built a house. Unfortunately, when they asked their surveyor to point out the property line, he indicated the wrong marker, and the Huntington's ended up building their house entirely on the Proctor's land.

Proctor sued to eject the Huntington's and remove their house. The trial court disagreed, finding that the Huntington's acted in good faith, and that removal would cause unnecessary hardship. Instead the court ordered the Huntington's to pay the Proctors for the value of the land under the house.

The case originated in Skamania County, and was appealed to District Two Court of Appeals.

State v. Afana, No. 82600-5. This case concerns whether a police officer's warrantless request for the ID of a passenger in a parked car constituted an unlawful seizure, and whether his subsequent search of the car was an unlawful search.

Mark Afana was parked with a friend, Jennifer Bergeron, in his car. A police officer approached them, asked what they were doing, and requested ID. Upon checking the ID the officer discovered a warrant against Bergeron and arrested her. In a search incident to the arrest the officer found drugs in the car.

At Afana's trial, the court held that the request for ID was an illegal stop and suppressed the drug evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the request for ID was mere social contact.

The case originated in Spokane County and was appealed to Division Three Court of Appeals. The Appeals Court upheld the search, but since then the allowable scope of vehicle searches was changed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, and by the state Supreme Court in State v. Patton.

This week at the Supreme Court, January 11, 2010

This week the Court commences its winter term. Barbara Madsen will be sworn in as the state's next chief justice on Monday morning. The event can be watched here on TVW. The Court will hear arguments in cases on January 12 and 14, and may issue opinions on January 14.

UPDATE: The video of Chief Justice Madsen's swearing-in ceremony is now available.

 

New Year resolutions and MMA fighting

Federalism, self-representation, traffic infractions, and mixed martial arts are all part of this month’s podcast.

Supreme Court of Washington Podcast (RSS) - New Year resolutions and MMA fighting

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Washington Supreme Court 2009 statistics

Every term we track the opinions and votes of each justice and provide a spreadsheet with a case-by-case breakout. Here are the numbers for 2009.

 

 Number of Opinions by Justice 

Justice

Majority Opinions

Concurring Opinions

Dissents

Total Opinions

Alexander

7

2

7

16

C.Johnson

15

1

4

20

Madsen

18

15

6

39

Sanders

11

5

20

36

Chambers

14

4

6

24

Owens

14

1

3

18

Fairhurst

12

5

6

23

J.Johnson

11

4

4

19

Stephens

15

3

3

21

 

The workload for 2009 was fairly evenly distributed. Soon-to-be Chief Justice Barbara Madsen was the most prolific writer this year, with 18 majority opinions and 39 total opinions. Justice Richard Sanders is the most frequent dissenter, writing nearly three times as many dissents as any other justice (including a dissent to his own majority opinion). As is common for the chief justice, Gerry Alexander wrote fewer opinions because of the additional administrative duties his position requires. Justice Debra Stephens participated in the fewest decisions as she joined the court after many of the cases had been argued, but she still managed to author the second-most majority opinions this year.

 

Frequency of Agreement between Justices

  C.Johnson
Madsen Sanders Chambers Owens Fairhurst J.Johnson Stephens
Alexander

79%

76%

70%

77%

80%

75%

81%

81%

  C.Johnson

84%

68%

80%

86%

81%

81%

81%

 
Madsen

68%

78%

87%

88%

77%

83%

      Sanders

79%

68%

66%

64%

75%

        Chambers

81%

76%

72%

88%

          Owens

88%

79%

84%

            Fairhurst

84%

83%

              J.Johnson

72%

 

Ever wonder which justices agree with each other most frequently? The above chart documents the percentage of cases in which justices are on the same side of an opinion (majority and concurring opinions are treated as equivalent). The justices with the highest rates of agreement were Madsen and Fairhurst (88%), Chambers and Stephens (88%), and Owens and Fairhurst (88%). The justices with the lowest rates of agreement were Sanders and Fairhurst (66%), and Sanders and Jim Johnson (64%).

 

Frequency in the Majority 

Justice

Majority Votes*

Total Votes

% in Majority

Unanimous Opinions

Alexander

 94

115

 82%

3

C.Johnson

106

117

 91%

 2

Madsen

 104

115

 90%

4

Sanders

 80

114

 70%

4

Chambers

 97

117

 83%

5

Owens

 108

117

 92%

5

Fairhurst

95

109

 87%

3

J.Johnson

96

117

 82%

5

Stephens

91

102

 89%

6

*Including concurring votes

 

Number of Decisions by Vote Count

Splits

Number of Cases

% of Total

9-0

58

49%

8-1

10

8%

8-0

1

1%

7-2

12

10%

6-3

19

16%

6-2

1

1%

5-4

16

14%

5-3

1

1%

 

Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which sees many narrow 5-4 decisions, the state Supreme Court enjoys a number of strong majority opinions, with nearly half of its rulings unanimous or 9-0 in the outcome. Justices will frequently concur in the result of an opinion, while employing a separate rationale for reaching his or her conclusion.

Coming Soon: the court's noteworthy opinions from 2009.

 

(Note: Feel free to use these numbers, but we'd appreciate if you'd cite the Supreme Court of Washington Blog as the source.)

Today's other opinion: juries and the Jones Act

Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., No. 82635-8. The Jones Act is a federal law that allows an injured seaman to sue his employer for negligence. Here, Justin Endicott's arm was crushed by a fish cart aboard Icicle Seafood's ship "Bering Star." He sued in King County Superior Court under the Jones Act and the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The Superior Court allowed Endicott to opt for a bench trial (no jury) and ruled for him on both claims. Icicle appeals on four grounds; the Court today addresses two: the bench trial and an award of prejudgment interest.

The decision is unanimous, and the opinion, written by Justice Stephens, includes a summary of the history of the Jones Act. On the jury trial question, the Ninth Circuit and California have held that the Jones Act grants plaintiffs "a substantive federal right to elect the mode of trial," while the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, Louisiana, and California, have found that while the plaintiff can choose "the jurisdictional basis of trial (in admiralty vs. at law) ... jury trial rights flow from this election as procedural incidents." While the trial court adopted the Ninth Circuit position, the State Supreme Court today sides with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

The Court holds that while the Jones Act grants Endicott the right to bring his case in state court, once he has made that decision, Washington's constitutional right to a jury trial applies. The prejudgment interest award is upheld, but only because it is permitted in a bench trial. The case is remanded for a new trial. (briefs and argument)

Opinion: Developer not required to seek stay to preserve land use permit on appeal

Kelly, et al. v. County of Chelan, et al., No. 81855-0 (briefs and argument).The question in this case is whether after a trial court revokes a permit granted to developers, do the stay provisions of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) require the developers to seek a stay in order to perverse their rights on appeal. Petitioner Robert Culp, for Munson Engineers, submitted an application for Anton Roeckl for a conditional use permit to develop Roeckl’s shoreline property on Lake Chelan. In August 2005 a hearing examiner issued a conditional use permit, requiring the developers to obtain all necessary approvals within two years.

Roeckl’s neighbors, Respondents Jeff Kelly and Nancy Dorsey, opposed the project and challenged the examiner’s decision in Chelan County Superior Court. In May 2006, the trial court reversed the examiner’s decision and revoked the permit.

The developers filed an appeal, but did not seek a stay of the trial court decision or the permit time limit. The appeal proceeded beyond the two year window set by the examiners. The neighbors argued the permit had expired as the developers failed to fulfill the permit requirements within the two year limit. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed the case.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, today unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that when a trial court denies a permit previously granted, that permit’s time limit is terminated unless the permit is reinstated. The Court wrote that the developers had no right to proceed with the project. The trial court order revoked the permit and in doing so terminated any applicable time limit. Thus, the stay provisions of LUPA did not apply.

The Court sent the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve other issues not yet addressed.

Tomorrow's opinions, Jan. 7, 2010

The Supreme Court will issue opinions in at least two cases tomorrow.

Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., No. 82635-8 (briefs and argument). Whether a defendant in a Jones Act, which enables maritime workers who are hurt on the job to sue their employers, is entitled to a jury trial in an action filed in state court.

Kelly, et al. v. County of Chelan, et al., No. 81855-0 (briefs and argument). Whether time limits on fulfilling the requirements of a conditional use permit continue to run pending appeal of a trial court order vacating the permit when the developer failed to request a stay of the order.

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January petitions for review

The Supreme Court accepted several new cases for review during its January 5 conference.

  • State v. Robinson, No. 83444-0
  • State v. Grier, No. 83452-1
  • State v. Jones, No. 83451-2
  • State v. Marohl, No. 83570-5
  • Mills v. W. Wash. Univ., No. 83597-7
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This week at the Supreme Court, January 4, 2010

The Supreme Court will consider new petitions for review on January 5, and may issue new opinions on January 7.