Opinions from Christmas Eve
Satomi Owners Ass'n v. Satomi, LLC, No. 80480-0 (consolidated with Blakely Commons Condominium Ass'n v. Blakely Commons, LLC, No. 80584-9 and The Pier at Leschi Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Leschi Corp., No. 81083-4). The issue common to these consolidated cases is "whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, preempts the judicial enforcement provision of the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), RCW 64.34.100(2)." The FAA is a federal law that requires federal and state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. The WCA is a state law that allows judicial review notwithstanding any "alternative methods of dispute resolution," including arbitration.
Each case began in 2005 or 2006 as a lawsuit by a condominium owners association alleging various construction defects and related claims. Most or all of the owners in each case had signed a warranty 
addendum containing an arbitration clause (either requiring arbitration for any construction defect claims or giving the seller the option of requiring arbitration).
In Satomi, the trial court quashed Satomi, LLC's motion to enforce the warranty addendum and compel arbitration, holding that (1) the FAA does not preempt the WCA, (2) all parties did not sign the warranty addendum, and (3) Satomi Association was not bound by the addendum. Satomi, LLC appealed, but then the parties settled. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied Satomi Association's motion to terminate review and decided the case. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's preemption ruling, but reversed as to the non-WCA claims (thus requiring arbitration of those claims). Satomi, LLC appealed the preemption ruling to the State Supreme Court. The Blakely and Leschi cases were subsequently consolidated with Satomi.
While recognizing the mootness of Satomi, the Court here "choose[s] to review the preemption question" because "it is one of 'continuing and substantial public interest.'" The Court reviews de novo both a trial court's decision to compel or deny arbitration and its determination of whether a state statute is preempted by federal law.
The FAA "simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms" (Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees). It's scope extends to "the full reach of the Commerce Clause." Here, the questions are whether the sale and warranting of the condominiums were transactions reached by the Commerce Clause and, if so, whether the WCA conflicts with the FAA and is therefore preempted in these three cases.
The State Supreme Court holds, per Katzenbach v. McClung and Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, "that the commerce clause necessarily reaches the warranting and sale of the condominiums in Satomi because 'such goods' [that came from out of state] amount to more than 70 percent of the component parts." Because the WCA would interfere with the arbitration agreements in these cases, it is preempted by the FAA. The Court upholds the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreements signed by condominium purchasers applies to Blakeley Association because it only asserts claims on behalf of those purchasers. The Court finds that Blakeley Association has failed to prove that the arbitration clauses were either procedural or substantive unconscionable. The Court declines to decide a number of factual and other issues, and remands Blakeley and Leschi to the trial courts.
The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion, joined by five other justices.
Justice Chambers, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Richard Sanders, dissents with a strong argument for federalism.
The majority incorrectly frames the issue, answers the wrong question, and ignores the nature of the homeowners' claims. The issue before us is whether a claim for breach of implied warranty, established by Washington statute after consultation with the stakeholders, imposed on Washington state builders, to protect condominium purchasers in Washington State, is preempted by federal laws because some of the materials used in building condominiums came from across the border. The answer is no....
After the jump, search incident to arrest (State v. Buelna Valdez) and attorney discipline (In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai).
State v. Buelna Valdez, No. 80091-0. Justice Sanders writes, in his majority opinion in this search-incident-to-arrest case, that "a journey through modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on automobile searches sets off from the harbor of its text, sails through Chimel and Belton, and drops anchor in the waters of Gant. The Justice takes readers on just such a trip in this case of the search of an automobile following its driver's arrest on an outstanding warrant. Two pounds of methamphetamine were discovered and used as evidence to convict both the driver and the passenger. The Court holds that the searches violated the federal and state constitutions, suppress the evidence, and dismiss the convictions.
The Chief Justice concurs as to the result based only on the state Constitution. Justice James Johnson concurs as to the result based only on the federal Constitution, believing this case to be essentially identical to Gant. (briefs, argument)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai, No. 200,578-1. A Washington State Bar Association hearing officer recommended Fredric Sanai be disbarred (related to conduct in his parents' divorce case) after denying Sanai's request for a continuance and holding the hearing without Sanai being present. Justice Madsen, writing for the majority, holds that the hearing officer abused his discretion and remands for a new hearing. Justice Chambers, joined by three other justices, chronicles the behavior that led to the action against Sanai and dissents. (previous post, Overlawyered post about Fredric's brother, briefs, argument)
