Opinion: custodial interference and exceptional sentences
State v. Boss and Pelts, No. 81897-5 (argument and briefs). Cynthia Boss was charged and convicted of first degree custodial interference pursuant to RCW 9A.40.060 for intentionally denying Child Protective Services (CPS) access to her daughter after an order awarding CPS legal custody of the child.
Boss appealed, arguing the trial court had committed reversible error because a jury instruction omitted one express element (lawfulness of the custody order) and one implied element (her knowledge of CPS’s right to custody of her daughter) of first degree custodial interference, and another jury instruction impermissibly commented on the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed Boss’s conviction.
The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Charles Johnson writing the unanimous opinion. The Court concluded: (1) the lawfulness of the custody order was a question for the trial court to decide as a matter of law, (2) knowledge of the right to physical custody is not an implied element of first degree custodial interference, and (3) Boss was not prejudiced by the trial court’s comment on the evidence.
State v. Powell, No. 80496-6 (argument and briefs). In 1997, Terrance Powell was charged with aggravated first degree murder. He was found guilty, but the conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals and remanded for retrial. At the subsequent jury trial Powell was found Powell guilty of first degree murder, and the trial judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 720 months after finding a number of aggravating factors. Powell's conviction and sentence were upheld by the Court of Appeals.
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Blakely v. Washington (which held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from enhancing sentences based on facts not found by the jury), Powell filed a new appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the exceptional sentence and remanded for resentencing. The State informed Powell of its intent to seek an exceptional sentence based on statutory aggravating circumstances. Powell moved for a standard range sentence. The trial court impaneled a jury to determine whether there were aggravating circumstances to justify an exceptional sentence.
Powell challenges the trial court’s decision on remand to impanel a jury, arguing the court had no authority to do so as the State did not give notice of intent to seek an exceptional sentence before trial.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed the trial court. Chief Justice Gerry Alexander wrote the 4-vote lead opinion, with two justices joining a concurrence.
We disagree with Powell’s contention that the notice provision in RCW 9.94A.537(1) requires the State give notice of its intent to seek an exceptional sentence. The statute merely states that the State “may” give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range prior to trial or entry of a guilty plea. The fact that Powell was not given notice prior to trial of the State’s intention to seek an exceptional sentence does not, therefore, run afoul of the plain language of the statute.
Justice Susan Owens and two others dissented.
