Opinions: speedy trials and jury instructions
State v. Kenyon, No. 81374-4. On February 15, 2006, James Ryan Kenyon was charged with six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was incarcerated while awaiting. After multiple delays his case eventually went to trial in August—well beyond the time limits provided by the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3).
A defendant who is detained in jail must have a trial set within 60 days of arraignment. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the rule’s time limits, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice so long as the defendant objects within 10 days after notice of trial date is mailed. Some periods of time are excluded when computing the date for trial. For example, continuances granted by the court are excluded, as well as “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances” that are beyond the control of the court or of the parties.
Kenyon argues his right to a speedy trial was violated as no court was available to hear his case. The State argues the trial court properly followed the scheduled and that his attorney asked for many continuances. The trial court held the delay was “unavoidable” as the judge was presiding over another case and the other judge was on vacation. The Supreme Court however, has said that courtroom congestion—as opposed to scheduling conflicts or trial preparation—is not a valid reason for delay.
The Court determined that despite the allowance for “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances,” the speedy trial rule still requires trial courts to document the details of unavailable judges and courtrooms. The failure to do so in this case violated Kenyon’s right to a speedy trial and the Court dismissed the charges with prejudice.
Justice Richard Sanders wrote the majority opinion. Justice Tom Chambers filed a separate opinion concurring with the result.
State v. O'Hara, No. 81062-1. Ryan O’Hara was charged with second degree assault after getting into a fight with an acquaintance, Jeffrey Loree. O’Hara argued that he acted in self defense. Loree had gained possession of the keys to O’Hara’s car. At trial, O’Hara argued he acted in self-defense. O’Hara testified that he repeatedly asked Loree for the keys to the car. He attempted to reach for the keys and Loree punched him in the forehead, at which point the two began exchanging blows.
At trial the court provided the jury with instructions regarding second degree assault, with additional details about the definition of “malice.” O’Hara was convicted as charged.
On appeal, O’Hara challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court provided the jury with an incomplete definition of “malice.” O’Hara had failed to object to this instruction at trial and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. A party on appeal is permitted to raise new issues of “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”
The Supreme Court, with Justice Mary Fairhurst writing the opinion, said that O’Hara could not demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged error was not of a constitutional magnitude or manifest. By failing to object to the instruction he failed to preserve the issue for review, and could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Justice Sanders filed a dissent. While he agreed that a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right" should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, he argued that O’Hara’s constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s jury instruction.
