Proctor v. Huntington, No. 82326-0. Dusty Moss subdivided his property into a 27-acre parcel purchased by the Huntingtons and an adjacent 30-acre parcel purchased by Proctor. Both parties were confused about their common boundary line, partly because they relied on the word of a surveyor who was apparently mistaken. 
The Huntingtons eventually built a house, garage, and well--all on Proctor's land. They have lived there since 1996.
In 2004, Proctor had his parcel surveyed because he was concerned that a different neighbor was encroaching on his land. Because of this survey, both Proctor and the Huntingtons came to realize that the Huntington improvements were on Proctor's side of their boundary line. After unsuccessful negotiations, Proctor sued to quiet title and to eject the Huntingtons. The Huntingtons counterclaimed for adverse possession and estoppel in pais. The trial court declined to decide for either party, instead crafting an equitable remedy that required Proctor to sell the one acre containing the Huntingtons' improvements to the Huntingtons for the fair market value of the land ($25,000). Both parties appealed.
The Court, with an opinion by Justice Stephens and joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, Chambers, and Charles Johnson, upholds the decision below.
The trial court's equitable approach in this case fits comfortably within the good-faith-mistake line of cases, including Arnold and Bufford, in which equity allows a court to apply a liability rule in lieu of rote application of a property rule. Because the trial court's chosen remedy was proper under Bufford and Arnold, the Court of Appeals was right to affirm it.
...
In upholding the equitable remedy imposed by the trial court, we recognize the evolution of property law in Washington away from rigid adherence to an injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible approach.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alexander and James Johnson, accuses the majority of overruling Arnold and violating protections of private property rights. The dissent looks to the Arnold decision's five-part test and would find that the Huntingtons could not satisfy two of those elements and thus were not entitled to their equitable relief. (briefs, argument)
Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 81931-9. The Court addresses whether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was time barred and whether a state agency is a "person" under RCW 4.24.510. While the Court unanimously determines that the 1983 claim was time barred, it fractures over the state law issue.
Michael Segaline is an electrician whose behavior shocked, offended, and possibly frightened staff at the L&I office where Segaline obtained electrical permits. L&I staff tried several times to reach an understanding with Segaline about his behavior, but finally told him that he was no longer allowed in the office. Segaline was subsequently arrested for criminal trespass when he refused to leave the office; the charge was later dropped. Segaline sued, alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and civil rights violations. He later moved to add the 1983 claim.
The trial court dismissed all Segaline's claims. It held the 1983 claim untimely filed and and determined that RCW 4.24.510, which protects "persons" who report information to government agencies, provided immunity to L&I. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The lead opinion, by Justice Sanders and joined by three other justices, finds the meaning of the word "person" ambiguous in the statute. However, because the purpose of the statute is to protect freedom of speech, and because government agencies have no such protection,
[i]t makes little sense to interpret "person" here so that an immunity, which the legislature enacted to protect one's free speech rights, extends to a government agency that has no such rights to protect.
The Chief Justice, in a written concurrence, disagrees with the lead opinion's rationale. She would instead reach the same result by looking to the history of anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statutes. Justice Charles Johnson, joined by three other justices, dissents and would hold that the immunity does extend to government agencies. (briefs, argument)
frightened women by repeatedly and slowly driving past them and, in the latter case, offering the woman a ride and money. Both women called 911 and Kintz, who admitted some of the details of each incident, was eventually charged.
messages for her using "incredibly vile language, including racial slurs and descriptive obscenities," and threatening to kill Willis, her new boyfriend, and the new couple's infant. Willis eventually called the police, who recorded ten messages left by Meneses that became the basis for ten charges against him: four counts of felony telephone harassment, four counts of gross misdemeanor telephone harassment, and two counts of intimidating a witness. He was convicted by a jury on all counts.
