Court: Initiative privatizing liquor sales is constitutional

This morning the Washington State Supreme Court issued a 5-4 ruling upholding the constitutionality of Initiative 1183, which privatized the distribution and retail sale of hard liquor.

Initiative 1183 was passed in November 2011 by a wide majority of voters. But several individuals and organizations challenged the measure, arguing that it violated Article II, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution. That constitutional provision requires bills and initiatives to only address a single subject and the subject of the measure must be stated in the title. The challengers argued that I-1183 embraced multiple subjects including privatizing hard liquor sales and changing regulations on wine and beer. The challengers also argued that I-1183 imposed new taxes while the bill title referred to the revenue as “fees.”

The majority was written by Justice Steven Gonzalez, who was appointed to the Supreme Court last year by Gov. Chris Gregoire. Justice Gonzalez wrote that the title of I-1183 was a general title, pertaining to the broad subject of “liquor.” The court held that the individual sections of the initiative were a rationally related to each other—including a $10 million earmark for local governments for public safety needs. The court also held that the voters of Washington were not misled by the initiative’s use of the word “fees” to describe the licensing fees the retailers will pay. (Challengers had argued that the fee is actually a tax and that voters would not have approved a new tax if it were described that way.)

Justice Wiggins filed a dissent, joined by three other justices. He wrote that the I-1183 drafters misled voters by describing the licensing fees as “fees” rather than “taxes.”

This ruling came on the last possible day for the court to intervene in the matter—I-1183 was set to be fully implemented on June 1.

Private retailers will begin selling liquor tomorrow.

Last call for state-run liquor stores?

Voters kicked the State out of the liquor business, but did they do so constitutionally? Today the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case challenging Initiative 1183. I have followed the case and watched today's arguments.

The challengers to I-1183 have two basic arguments: first, that the initiative covered more than one subject, and second, that some items in the initiative were not accurately reflected in the ballot title.

I think the challengers have more support for the second argument. On the single-subject issue, the justices didn’t seem very troubled that I-1183 privatized liquor and also included a $10 million appropriation to local government from the liquor fund. But several justices had concerns about whether the state revenue collected through liquor sales should be classified as a tax or a fee, and whether the voters were misled by the ballot title.

There’s also a question of whether the court could strike down one section and leave the rest standing. If there are 99 bottles of beer on the wall and you take one down, what happens to the rest of them? It’s likely the court would toss the whole measure if it finds any constitutional flaws.

If the court plans to strike down I-1183 it must act before June 1 when the initiative will be fully implemented. The court on occasion issues an order to resolve a case and then follows up with a written opinion some months later. So if the justices strike the law down it’s possible we won’t know why right away.

What will the court do? It’s difficult to predict. Several justices seemed troubled by the initiative and other justices signaled they had no problem with it. At this point, I would not be surprised by either outcome.

Today's argument: Liquor privitazation and single subjects

Drinkers know to mix their liquors carefully. "Beer before liquor, never sicker; liquor before beer, never fear." 

Initiative writers face the same peril when combining topics in a ballot measure.

Article II, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution states that legislative bills are to embrace no more than one subject, and that subject has to be stated in the title of the bill. The same rule applies to initiatives.

Washington voters approved the Costco-sponsored Initiative 1183 in 2011, which privatized the state's liquor distribution and retail system -- a system previously monopolized by the state's Liquor Control Board.

Several challengers sued, arguing that the initiative contains more than one subject, and that not all details in the measure relate back to the title.

Cowlitz County Superior Court Judge Stephen Warning ruled in March that I-1183 did not unconstitutionally embrace more than one subject. His ruling allowed the state to continue implementing the initiative, which will be fully implemented by June 1 unless the Supreme Court intervenes.

Two groups filed friend of the court briefs in the case. The Teamsters union and UFCW Local 21 argued the measure is unconstitutional, while several local government officials argued the measure is constitutional (Maureen Atkison, Yakima City Council and Deputy Mayor; Steve Buri, Newcastle City Council; Don Gough, Lynnwood Mayor, Lenny Greenstein, Lacey City Council; Mark Lamb, Bothell Mayor; Richard Muri, Pierce County Council; Lynn Schilaty, Snohomish City Council; and Kevin Wallace, Bellevue City Council.) 

The Supreme Court agreed to expedited review in this appeal. Today the parties will present oral arguments at 2:00. This blog will report on the arguments later today.

Supreme Court to review executive privilege case

Last week the Supreme Court agreed to review the question of whether the Governor of Washington enjoys executive privilege. The case is Freedom Foundation v. Christine O. Gregoire, No. 86384-9.

The Freedom Foundation requested records from the Governor’s office. When Gov. Gregoire withheld the records, asserting executive privilege, the Foundation sued, arguing that executive privilege is not a recognized exemption to the Public Records Act. Thurston County Superior Court Judge Carol Murphy held that executive privilege is inherent in the Washington Constitution, based on the separation of powers doctrine. The Freedom Foundation appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

The Court will review the issue of whether the Governor can assert executive privilege, and if so, how that privilege interacts with the Public Records Act.

(Note: The publisher of this blog is a party in the lawsuit.)

State Patrol ordered to release bicycle accident records

Gendler v. Batiste, No. 85408-4. Today the Supreme Court ordered the Washington State Patrol to provide accident records to the victim of a bicycle accident. Michael Gendler suffered a severe bicycle accident when crossing Montlake Bridge in Seattle. His bike tire became wedged in the bridge grating, tossing him from the bike. Gendler was rendered a quadriplegic, unable to live independently, and unable to work full time in his law practice. Gender suspected his accident was not uncommon and requested records of other bicycle accidents from the Washington State Patrol. The WSP refused to provide the records unless Gendler certified that he would not use them in a lawsuit. Gendler was not willing to waive his right to litigation and sued WSP for violations of the Public Records Act. The trial court ruled for Gendler, ordering disclosure of the historical bicycle records. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State Patrol had a statutory obligation to collect traffic collision reports and had to disclose those reports.

The Supreme Court agreed, voting 7-2 for Gendler. Justice Mary Fairhurst wrote the majority opinion. WSP argued throughout that a federal statute, 23 U.S.C. 409, protects certain records compiled for federal highway safety reporting purposes. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that WSP has an independent obligation to collect information about accidents under state law, and that the agency could not rely on the federal statute to avoid providing the records.
 

Supreme Court to review liquor privitization initiative

The Supreme Court has agreed to an expedited review of a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Initiative 1183. I-1183 passed in 2011 and privatizes the state's liquor distribution and retail system. Challengers argue that the initiative violates the state constitution's single-subject rule.

Cowlitz County Superior Court Judge Stephen Warning ruled in March that I-1183 did not unconstitutionally embrace more than one subject. His ruling allowed the state to continue implementing the initiative.

Today the Supreme Court is considering an emergency motion for injunctive relief to evaluate whether to halt implementation of the initiative. Without an injunction the state retail stores could be privatized by the time the Supreme Court issues a ruling.

The case is set for argument on May 17.

The case is Washington Association for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, No. 87188-4.

Richard Sanders to attempt return to Supreme Court

Today we received an email from former Justice Richard Sanders declaring his candidacy for the open seat that will be left by the retirement of Justice Tom Chambers.

In the press release Sanders wrote,

"I am seeking election to the court so the citizens of this state can have an experienced jurist who values the rights of private citizens. This is not just another political position to be filled with attack ads and sound bites. We need men and women who will stand on principle to protect the rights of every person—not just the political powerful or the popular,”

Sanders previously served on the Court from 1995 to 2011. He lost re-election in 2010 by a narrow margin to Justice Wiggins, receiving 49.6% of the vote.

More info is at the campaign website - http://friendsofjustice.com/.

 

 

Today's arguments - March 15, 2012

Bain v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, et al and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, et al, No. 86206-1 (consolidated w/ 86207-9). May a party be a lawful “beneficiary” under Washington’s Deed of Trust Act if it never held the promissory note secured by the deed of trust?

State v. Ortega, No. 85788-1. Generally, an officer has lawful authority to arrest a misdemeanor suspect only if the offense was committed in the officer’s presence. Was Ortega lawfully arrested when one officer observed the offense and instructed another officer to carry out the arrest?

In re: Custody of A.F.J., No. 86188-9. The court must decide if service as a foster parent alone precludes a finding of de facto parentage.

Robb v. Seattle, No. 85658-3. During a stop of a burglary suspect, two Seattle police officers observed but did not pick up nearby shotgun shells. After later retrieving the shells, the suspect shot and killed Michael Robb. Did the officers merely fail to prevent a dangerous situation or did they affirmatively create the danger, thus incurring liability for Robb’s death?

 

*Summaries prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office.
 

Seattle's ban on firearms in city parks rejected

In 2009 the City of Seattle adopted a ban on concealed firearms in city parks. The move was criticized by gun rights advocates and even Attorney General Rob McKenna, who issued a formal opinion stating that cities cannot adopt gun regulations that are more restrictive than state law.

Several individuals challenged the firearm rule with the help of the Second Amendment Foundation. The trial court and Court of Appeals both ruled that state law preempts Seattle from enacting a rule that prohibits the possession of firearms at city parks and park facilities. The case was appealed to the state Supreme Court, which denied the city's petition for review.

The case is Chan v. City of Seattle, No. 86774-7.

February petitions for review

The Supreme Court has accepted several new cases for review.

State v. Arreola, No. 86610-4. Gilberto Arreola was convicted of a felony driving under the influence in the first degree. The patrol officer that arrested Arreola followed him for over a half mile because his vehicle fit the description of a car reportedly driven by a suspected drunk driver. The officer noticed that Arreola’s car had a modified muffler. The muffler was in violation of state vehicle requirements. The officer pulled over Arreola with the primary motive of investigating whether or not he was driving under the influence. The officer testified that the muffler was an additional reason for the stop and it would have caused him to stop the defendant despite his suspicion of drunk driving.

Pretextual traffic stops are unconstitutional under Article I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The Court of Appeals (Div. III) held that this traffic stop was unconstitutional because the stop for the muffler was pretext for the suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence.

State v. Ollivier, No. 86633-3. Brandon Ollivier was convicted of possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit activity. Ollivier is a registered sex offender and his two roommates were sex offenders. One of his roommates told police that the defendant had showed him a video of a young girl having sexual relations with a young boy. He also said that the defendant showed him photographs of young girls provocatively posed. Ollivier was convicted of one count of possession of depictions of minors engage in sexually explicit conduct and sentenced to 30 months.

Ollivier appealed. He contended that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the informant’s information was unreliable, and that the search warrant was overbroad, not supported by probable cause, and was improperly served.

The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the conviction. The Court held that the delay of 22 months between arrest and trial due to the defense counsel’s continuances did not violate the right to speedy trial. The court also held that the search warrant affidavit based on tip from the defendant’s roommate was adequate to establish probable cause and the search warrant described with sufficient particularity items to be seized and searched. The police officers’ failure to show defendant written copy of search warrant until after execution of search did not invalidate the search warrant or search.

WA Off-Highway Vehicle Alliance v. State, No 86602-3. Four off-road vehicle users and two organizations sued the Washington Parks and Recreation Commission, challenging the constitutionality of a legislative appropriation of motor vehicle fuel excise tax revenues for a park maintenance fund. 

The Court of Appeals (Div. II) held that the appropriation of excess funds in non-highway and off-road vehicle activities program account for funding park maintenance “was a ‘refund’ authorized by law, within meaning of state constitutional provision stating that refunds authorized by law for taxes paid on motor vehicle fuels are highway purposes for which such taxes may be expended.” The court held that the legislative appropriation should benefit non-highway users who paid motor vehicle fuel excise taxes.

Lowman v. Wilbur, No. 86584-1. Nathan Lowman met Jennifer Wilbur at the Country Corner Bar and Grill. Wilbur was intoxicated and invited Lowman to go home with her. She drove her vehicle with Lowman in the passenger seat, under the influence of alcohol. On the way home, she wrecked her car in to a utility pole. (Wilbur later pleaded guilty to vehicular assault.) Lowman sued Wilbur, Country Corner, Puget Sound Energy and Skagit County. Lowman’s complaint alleged that Puget Sound Energy and Skagit County negligently placed the utility pole in a location that could cause injury to travelers. His complaint stated that the pole was located four feet from the edge of the road past a sharp curve.

The Snohomish County Superior Court dismissing the negligence claims against Puget Sound Energy and Skagit County, holding that their actions were not the legal cause of the injury. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the decision.

Today's arguments - February 28, 2012

In re: Bakary Fansu Conteh, an Attorney at Law, No. 200,915-8. Did the attorney violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and, if so, what sanction should be imposed?

In re the Detention of: Kevin Coe a/k/a Fredrick Harlan Coe, No. 85965-5. Kevin Coe challenges his designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The court must decide several issues, primarily whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of unadjudicated sexual assaults, whether the State’s expert properly relied on that evidence, and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction defining the term “personality disorder.”

State v. Emeray, et al, No. 86033-5. Emeray and Olson were convicted at a joint trial of kidnapping, robbery, and rape. They raise four issues on appeal, including the trial court’s denial of Olson’s motions to sever and the prosecutor’s explanation of reasonable doubt.

In re: Rosaura Del Carmen Rodriguez, an Attorney at Law, No. 200,960-3. The Court will decide whether the evidence supports a finding that attorney Rosaura Del Carmen Rodriguez violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and impose an appropriate sanction.
 

*Summaries prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office.

Mason County assessment tossed out

Today the Washington State Supreme Court ruled in favor of four Mason County residents who disputed a special assessment that Mason County had levied on nonforest lands.

In 2003, Mason County imposed an annual assessment of $5.00 on certain parcels to “create a fund dedicated to addressing water resource protection issues within Mason County.” By 2007 the county had collected more than $1.1 million from the assessment. A group of property owners (James R. Cary, Mary Alice Cary, John E. Diehl and William D. Fox Sr.) challenged the validity of the assessment. The trial court ruled that the county had levied an unconstitutional tax, but the Court of Appeals upheld the assessment in 2009.

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously for the property owners, with Justice Gerry Alexander writing the opinion. The decision turned on Mason County’s failure to comply with statutory requirements when imposing special assessments for natural resource conservation under RCW 89.08.400(3). The assessment rate can be imposed either as a uniform rate per acre or a flat rate per parcel plus a uniform rate per acre. Mason County assessed $5 per parcel but failed to set a per acre rate. The residents who challenged the assessment will be entitled to refunds.

The case is Cary, et al. v. Mason County, No. 83937-9.

(Full disclosure: The publisher of this blog filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the residents challenging the assessment.)

Today's arguments - February 16, 2012

Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 85784-9. Brandon Afoa worked at Sea-Tac Airport and got hurt on the job; should the Port of Seattle have to pay for his injuries?

State v. Tarhan, No. 85737-7. The trial court sealed juror questionnaires without conducting a Bone-Club analysis, which is required before a courtroom is closed or records are sealed to the public. The court must determine whether this violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial, and if so, whether a new trial is required.

Diaz v. Medical Center Laboratory, Inc., P.S., et al, No. 86049-1. In a medical malpractice case, can the defendant tell the jury that the plaintiff settled with a codefendant?

*Summaries prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Today's arguments - February 14, 2012

In re: Thomas R. Kamb, No. 200,926-3. The Court must determine whether attorney Thomas R. Kamb violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and impose appropriate sanctions for any violations.

Anfinson, et al. v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., No. 85949-3. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury on how to distinguish between employees and independent contractors?  Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury on proof of class members’ employee status?  If the trial court’s instructions were erroneous, was the class prejudiced?  Also, does judicial estoppel apply to Anfinson’s legal argument?

Gorman v. City of Woodinville, No. n/a, RCW 4.16.160 prohibits claims “predicated on the lapse of time” from being asserted against the government.  Does this statute bar a claim of title brought against a city when the plaintiff claims to have acquired title by adverse possession before the land was dedicated to the government?

*Summaries prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Tribal member's fishing citation tossed out

In State v. Jim, No. 84716-9, the Supreme Court held that the Maryhill Treaty Fishing Access Site, created for Columbia River tribes to fish under provision of treaty, was not within the criminal jurisdiction of Washington State.

Lester Ray Jim, a member of the Yakama Nation, was fishing on the Columbia River at the Maryhill site. Washington Fish and Wildlife officers cited Jim for taking ashore five undersized sturgeon.  Jim had argued that it was common practice in the Yakama Nation to release the sturgeon when returning to shore. Under state statute he was in violation for not “immediately” releasing the fish whereas under tribal regulation he is allowed a “reasonable opportunity” to release the sturgeon.

The issue in this case turned on whether Maryhill was an established reservation for issues of jurisdiction; the court used State v. Sohappy for guidance. In Sohappy the court held that a fishing site similar to Maryhill, Cooks Landing, was a reservation so far as defining criminal jurisdiction. Notably persuasive was the fact that Maryhill is used exclusively for members of the tribes and not other common citizens. The Supreme Court, with Justice Susan Owens writing, held that the State lacked jurisdiction to cite Jim.

Justice Charles Wiggins and two others dissented in a lengthy opinion explaining their view that Maryhill was not, in fact, a reservation and therefore within the purview of state criminal jurisdiction.

This blog assumes that one cannot brag about the "big one that got away" when cited by Fish and Wildlife for catching undersized fish.